Four Conversations on America’s Political Shift, Europe’s Choices and the Future of the West

Why Strategic Conversations?

European integration has always been shaped by ideas as much as by institutions. While treaties, negotiations and reforms define the formal architecture of enlargement, the future of Europe is equally influenced by the strategic conversations that precede political decisions. As the European Union enters a period marked by geopolitical competition, democratic uncertainty and institutional transformation, enlargement itself is becoming the subject of a new generation of questions.

The debate is no longer confined to the pace of negotiations or the fulfilment of accession benchmarks. It increasingly concerns the strategic purpose of enlargement, the resilience of democratic institutions, the consequences of prolonged uncertainty, the role of anticipatory governance and the societal foundations upon which European integration ultimately depends.

These are not questions that lend themselves to simple or definitive answers. They require dialogue between European institutions, national governments, researchers, civil society and citizens. They require the willingness to look beyond immediate political developments and consider the longer-term choices that will shape the future of both the European Union and its candidate countries.

PRESPA Strategic Conversations is conceived as a contribution to that dialogue.

Rather than offering policy prescriptions, the series seeks to stimulate informed reflection on emerging issues relevant to European integration, democratic governance and strategic resilience. Each issue brings together a small number of strategic conversations intended to encourage debate, challenge assumptions and explore new perspectives on the evolving European project.

In Beyond the Ballot, that approach is applied to US political change and the future of transatlantic cooperation. The four conversations consider Europe’s role in shaping the partnership, whether the years before 2028 can be used to make it more resilient, and what Washington and Brussels may do next in the Western Balkans. The region’s European future is one test of whether the West can turn geopolitical language into a coherent project.

Beyond the Ballot

The 2026 United States midterm elections changed the balance of power in Washington. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress, while Donald Trump remains President for two more years. The result creates divided government at a moment when American foreign policy has become a source of economic and strategic uncertainty for allies. The campaign and vote were shaped by domestic concerns, including the cost of living and the consequences of the war with Iran. The outcome should not be treated as a clear public mandate for a different foreign policy. It does, however, alter the political conditions in which that policy will be made.

A new Congress may scrutinise the administration, shape budgets and legislation, block or delay appointments, and give greater visibility to international cooperation. It cannot simply take over the President’s role in diplomacy or day-to-day foreign policy. The central question is what a Congress supportive of alliances can preserve or influence while the White House remains sceptical of multilateral commitments. The interval before the 2028 presidential election could become a period of drift, or one in which the United States and its allies prepare a more durable partnership. Neither outcome is assured.

Europe enters this interval as both an affected partner and an actor with responsibilities of its own. European governments have had to respond to American demands over defence, trade and security while confronting weaknesses in their own capacity to act. It is not enough to ask what Washington may do to Europe; we should also ask how European choices have shaped the relationship and what Europe can now change. This does not equate European shortcomings with American political choices. It recognises that Europe’s readiness, unity and ability to define priorities will affect the partnership’s future.

The Western Balkans offer a revealing vantage point. Political change in Hungary and Serbia coincides with political continuity in North Macedonia, where the government has presented its relationship with Trump as unusually close. These cases raise a question about the political umbrella Washington may have provided to leaders who challenged Brussels or resisted its expectations. The umbrella need not have rested on intimate personal ties or a coordinated bloc. Its effects may have come through signals of legitimacy, political cover or a belief that the United States would counterbalance European pressure.

The four conversations trace this problem from Washington to Europe and then to the Balkans. They ask what is changing in American foreign policy, how European choices have shaped and will be affected by that change, whether the period before 2028 can be used to strengthen the transatlantic relationship, and what Washington and Brussels will do next in Southeast Europe. Enlargement remains within the argument as part of the West’s wider political horizon, not as the issue’s visible subject. The aim is to test whether domestic division in the United States can coexist with renewed transatlantic convergence—and whether that convergence can produce a credible regional order.

Strategic Conversation I

The American Turn

The Question

Midterm elections are often read as a verdict on the President, but their institutional effect is more specific: they change who controls Congress while leaving the executive in place. In 2026, voters shifted both chambers to the opposition during a presidency marked by conflict with allies and a more conditional approach to international commitments. What can this change in Congress do to American foreign policy, and what does it reveal about the durability of the United States’ role in the world? An electoral rebuke may constrain a President without producing a settled alternative to his foreign policy.

The Context

Foreign policy rarely determines a midterm election by itself. This time, however, international choices were closely connected to domestic life. The war with Iran and tariffs were linked in public debate to fuel, household costs and the administration’s stewardship of the economy. Reuters reported that voters saw the election partly as an opportunity to rebuke the President, while the campaign also focused on affordability and corruption. The vote therefore cannot be reduced to a referendum on NATO, Ukraine or America’s global role.

The result changes the institutional environment. The opposition will control congressional committees and the legislative agenda. It can investigate executive decisions, contest budget priorities, scrutinise foreign policy and make it more difficult to secure confirmations or pass legislation. The President retains substantial authority in diplomacy and other areas of foreign policy, as well as the veto. A change in congressional control can produce friction and restraint without delivering an immediate reversal of the administration’s direction.

The Conversation

The election’s clearest foreign-policy consequence may be a change in constraint rather than command. Congress can raise the political and administrative cost of abrupt decisions, expose their consequences and make room for alternative positions. Where a broad coalition exists, it can legislate, shape funding and preserve commitments. US law places limits on unilateral withdrawal from NATO, though the relationship between congressional authority and presidential power remains contested.

These tools matter, but they do not add up to a second foreign-policy executive. A Congress that supports international cooperation cannot guarantee that the President will consult allies, follow congressional preferences or represent the same strategic purpose abroad. Legislative action can be slowed by party discipline, procedural barriers, vetoes and differences within the opposition itself. Support for NATO or international engagement should not be treated as uniform across all Democrats; any more than every Republican position can be inferred from the White House.

This leaves the United States with two overlapping signals. The election demonstrates that opposition to the President’s approach can win at scale. At the same time, it leaves the President in office with significant executive powers and a clear ability to continue shaping international policy. Allies should neither treat the result as proof that the United States has abandoned its role nor assume that a congressional majority can restore the former pattern of American leadership on its own.

The longer-term shift may be more consequential than the immediate balance of power. Foreign policy is closely bound to domestic political identity, party competition and economic grievance. Even if the next administration adopts a different tone, the forces that made American commitments more contested are unlikely to disappear. The question is not simply whether the United States will return to its previous position, but how much continuity can be expected when the meaning of international engagement changes from one administration to the next.

Why This Matters?

For allies, the difference between American power and American predictability is now central. The midterms have created new checks in Washington, but not a settled direction. Understanding what Congress can—and cannot—change is essential to judging whether the United States remains a dependable partner through the next two years and beyond.

Strategic Conversation II

Europe in the Mirror

The Question

European governments often describe the current strain as a consequence of American unpredictability. That is part of the story, but not the whole one. The transatlantic relationship has long carried arguments about burden-sharing, European defence capacity and the gap between Europe’s political ambitions and its ability to act. To what extent have European choices contributed to the present imbalance—and how will the US election result affect Europe’s security, influence and room for action? The question is not whether Europe caused the transformation in US politics. It is whether Europe’s own decisions have left it less able to shape the response.

The Context

The United States’ approach to alliances has become more conditional, while European governments have faced renewed pressure to assume greater responsibility for their security. Some of that pressure reflects long-standing American complaints; some reflects a changed US political climate in which commitments are more openly debated. European governments have not responded uniformly. They differ on defence spending, military support, trade policy and how to manage relations with Washington. Analysis by the German Marshall Fund points to a weakening of public support for NATO among Republicans, while support among Democrats remains substantially higher. This makes European dependence on a stable American consensus more precarious.

The midterms may give internationalist voices greater influence in Congress, but the executive branch remains central to US policy. Europe therefore faces both an opening and a warning: the alliance may have more defenders in Washington’s legislature, while American foreign policy continues to be shaped by a White House whose priorities do not necessarily align with theirs.

The Conversation

It would be misleading to say Europe caused the United States’ political shift. Domestic American choices have their own causes and agency. But European governments have helped shape the conditions in which transatlantic bargaining takes place. Where Europe has relied on US capabilities without building sufficient capacity of its own, it has made its influence more dependent on Washington’s continued willingness to lead. Where European states disagree, they make it easier for US administrations to engage with them separately rather than as a strategic partner.

This is not an argument that Europe must simply meet every American demand. Nor does greater European capacity require abandoning NATO or seeking an equal but separate military pole. The harder question is whether Europe can define common interests, develop the means to pursue them and negotiate from a position of greater agency. Strategic autonomy can strengthen the alliance when it allows Europeans to contribute more, sustain shared commitments and act when US attention is elsewhere. It can weaken the alliance if it becomes a slogan for divergent national projects or a substitute for cooperation.

The election also affects Europe directly. Congressional oversight may clarify which American commitments have durable support and which depend on the President’s discretion. Legislative action may limit some abrupt shifts, while investigations and public disagreement may make American policy appear even less coherent in the short term. European governments will have to decide whether to engage Congress, the administration or both—and how to avoid making their own policies hostage to the next electoral cycle.

The essential European choice is not between dependence and independence. It is whether to remain a consumer of American guarantees or become a partner whose capabilities and political unity help define the terms of cooperation. That entails costly decisions and may expose internal disagreements. It also gives Europe a way to influence the partnership rather than only react to it. The American election did not create this choice, but it makes postponing it harder.

Why This Matters?

A more capable Europe could help keep the transatlantic partnership credible through political changes in Washington. But capability without unity will not produce influence, and autonomy without cooperation may deepen the fragmentation Europe hopes to manage. The election makes Europe’s own choices part of the transatlantic story.

Strategic Conversation III

The 2028 Gap

The Question

Imagine a Congress that strongly supports international cooperation and NATO while the White House remains sceptical of alliances or pursues a more isolationist and erratic foreign policy. This would not remove the President’s powers, but it could create a contested period inside Washington. The presidential election is still two years away. Can Congress and America’s allies sustain the partnership during that interval—and can they use the time to prepare a stronger basis for cooperation? Or will waiting allow uncertainty to become the new normal?

The Context

The new Congress will take office in January 2027. Its capacity to influence foreign policy will depend on where congressional preferences overlap with the administration’s, and on which instruments it can use. Congress can hold hearings, conduct oversight, shape appropriations, legislate and influence appointments. Yet the President retains broad authority in diplomacy and important areas of foreign policy, and can veto legislation. A change in congressional control can therefore produce friction and restraint without delivering a coherent alternative strategy.

The United States also has legal guardrails around NATO membership: Congress has enacted a restriction on unilateral presidential withdrawal, although legal and constitutional questions about the respective powers of Congress and the President remain. Such a safeguard can limit one extreme outcome; it cannot ensure that allies receive consistent consultation, credible signals or reliable support in every crisis. The partnership’s day-to-day political condition may matter as much as its formal architecture.

The Conversation

The interval before 2028 is not empty time. Governments will set defence priorities, manage crises, negotiate trade and judge how much confidence to place in American commitments. If allies simply wait for a different President, they risk carrying the same vulnerabilities and disagreements into the next election. If they treat the current administration as permanent, they may foreclose cooperation still possible through Congress, institutions and public constituencies.

The gap can be a holding period, with Congress limiting sharp breaks and signalling that the alliance retains domestic support. It can also be a preparation period: Europe strengthens its capacity; allies reinforce practical cooperation and institutions become less dependent on any one leader. These paths can coexist, but neither is automatic. Congress may protect funding or limit decisions; it cannot direct a consistent executive policy. European defence investment alone cannot create political unity.

Some commitments are time-sensitive; a crisis can expose the limits of congressional checks. Defence industrial capacity, readiness and shared planning take years. Yet building a partnership around assumptions about 2028 is also risky: the outcome is uncertain, and any next administration will inherit a changed American political landscape.

The strategic task is to treat time as a resource that can be used but not controlled. Washington’s competing centres of power may create opportunities for allies to preserve channels and build support. Brussels and European capitals can use the same period to strengthen their own position and clarify what they expect from a renewed partnership. The challenge is to do so without confusing temporary congressional alignment with a guaranteed return to past policy.

Why This Matters?

The two years before 2028 will shape the starting point for whatever follows. The question is whether the alliance spends them absorbing uncertainty or uses them to make cooperation more resilient to political change on both sides of the Atlantic.

Strategic Conversation IV

The Balkan Test

The Question

The Western Balkans face two changes at once: a divided Washington and a shifting regional political map. The Trump administration may have provided a political umbrella for leaders who challenged Brussels or resisted its expectations, even where their personal ties to the President were less substantial than claimed. What happens to that umbrella now? What will Washington and Brussels do next, and how will their choices shape the region? The question is not simply who fills a vacuum. It is whether a vacuum emerges, what forces can exploit it and whether a more coherent Western approach is possible.

The Context

Hungary has entered a post-Orbán period after Péter Magyar’s election victory. In Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic conceded defeat to a student-backed movement, but the composition and international direction of the new political order remain uncertain. North Macedonia presents a different case: Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski has spoken of close proximity to Trump, while the practical value of that claimed relationship remains open to scrutiny. These are not three versions of the same transition. They are a change of government in Hungary, an unsettled transition in Serbia and political continuity in North Macedonia.

Brussels is publicly reaffirming the Western Balkans’ European perspective. In advance of the 25 November EU–Western Balkans summit, European Council President António Costa described accession as a geopolitical investment and pointed to gradual integration as a source of visible benefits before membership. Those statements create a standard against which European action can be judged: does the Union’s strategic language produce credible movement, or does the region continue to experience a gap between promises and political outcomes? [8][9]

The Conversation

‘Axis of Annoyance’ is useful shorthand for a political pattern, but the publication should not imply a coordinated bloc. The more useful hypothesis is that a US political umbrella—through public signals, perceived endorsement or tolerance of challenges to European expectations—may have given different leaders room to manoeuvre. Its effect need not have depended on private closeness to Trump. Nor should the analysis assume that the umbrella alone caused the region’s exposure to malign influence. Local political choices, weak institutions, competing external interests and the credibility of Europe’s own offer all matter.

The change in Washington raises a question about whether that umbrella is weakening or becoming more contested. A Congress that supports international cooperation may provide a counterweight, but the White House will remain in office until 2029. Brussels may have greater opportunity to shape events, particularly if these changes create new openings. But leadership turnover does not guarantee policy convergence. Magyar’s government has maintained at least some agreements made under Orbán, while Serbia’s new political direction is not yet settled. The continuity of institutions, networks and policy interests may matter as much as the names of leaders.

North Macedonia brings the stakes into sharp relief. A small state may value access to Washington, but it must distinguish a claimed relationship from durable leverage. If political closeness to a US administration is treated as a substitute for a credible European path, what does the country gain—and what might it risk? This should not presume that Skopje can choose only Brussels or Washington. It should ask whether its choices broaden its options or make its European future more dependent on an American relationship that may not deliver lasting influence.

The region is not a passive arena. Governments, opposition movements, citizens and institutions will shape how US and European choices are received. Outside actors can exploit uncertainty, but their influence depends partly on local conditions and on whether Western policy offers credible alternatives. The decisive question for Washington and Brussels is therefore not only how to respond to individual leaders, but how to make their policies reinforce stability, agency and a credible European horizon. Enlargement remains in the background as one measure of that horizon: not the issue’s headline, but a test of whether the West can turn geopolitical language into a political future.

Why This Matters?

The Balkans will show whether a changing transatlantic partnership can do more than manage uncertainty. If Washington and Brussels fail to align their choices, regional political openings may be shaped by forces with little interest in a democratic and European future. If they coordinate credibly, the region can become evidence that Western convergence still has practical meaning.

Sources:

[1] Reuters, ‘Democrats seize Congress in sweeping midterm repudiation of Trump’, 4 November 2026. https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/democrats-seize-congress-sweeping-midterm-repudiation-trump-2026-11-04/

[2] European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘Understanding the 2026 United States midterm elections’, 2026. https://eprs.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS_BRI%282026%29791533?locale=EN

[3] Congressional Research Service, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty: U.S. Legal Obligations and Congressional Authorities’, 2026. https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/LSB11256.html

[4] German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘More Turbulence Ahead’, 2026. https://www.gmfus.org/news/more-turbulence-ahead

[5] Reuters, ‘Magyar sworn in as Hungary’s prime minister on promises of change’, 9 May 2026. https://www.investing.com/news/economic-indicators/magyar-sworn-in-as-hungarys-prime-minister-on-promises-of-change-4674639

[6] Reuters, ‘After Vucic defeat, Serbia waits to learn how student-backed leaders will govern’, 26 October 2026. https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/after-vucic-defeat-serbia-waits-to-see-how-studentbacked-leaders-will-govern-4971914

[7] Truthmeter, ‘Mickoski’s interview with Breitbart: Manipulations, facts and spins in the story of Washington and the EU’, 2026. https://truthmeter.mk/mickoskis-interview-with-breitbart-manipulations-facts-and-spins-in-the-story-of-washington-and-the-eu/

[8] European Council, ‘EU–Western Balkans summit to take place in Brussels on 25 November’, 23 October 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/10/23/eu-western-balkans-summit-to-take-place-in-brussels-on-25-november/

[9] European Council President António Costa, ‘Statement in the context of the Euronews EU Enlargement Summit 2026’, 3 November 2026. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hr/press/press-releases/2026/11/03/statement-by-president-costa-in-the-context-of-the-euronews-eu-enlargement-summit-2026/